During the Great War, the period 1914 to 1915 was one of the most intense stages of interaction by Lithuanian society with daily life of the war, and at the same time the most active stage in military action in the future Lithuania. While many men were called up into the ranks of the Imperial Russian army, most of the remaining population ended up under the military authorities, experienced the requisition of their personal property, and observed (at first in the rear) intense military movements to and fro. This article looks at how the change in the front line, and the successes and failures of the armies of the Romanov Empire, contributed to the change in the image of the Russian army in the Lithuanian discourse. features of the change are revealed in the article by analysing both the line taken by the official press during the initial period of the Great War, and the assessments of the Russian army that appeared in individual reflections (diaries and memoirs). It asks how the image of the Russian army changed during this period, and why. KEY WORDS: first World War, Imperial Russian army, army image, discourse, war propaganda, war representation, war reception. ANOTACIJA Didžiojo karo metais 1914-1915 metų laikotarpis buvo vienas intensyviausių lietuvių visuomenės sąveikos su karo kasdienybe etapų ir kartu aktyviausias karo veiksmų būsimosios Lietuvos teritorijoje tarpsnis. Tuo metu, kai daug krašto vyrų buvo mobilizuota į Rusijos imperijos kariuomenės gretas, dauguma likusių gyventojų atsidūrė karinės valdžios dispozicijoje, patyrė asmeninio turto rekvizicijas ir stebėjo (pirma užnugaryje) intensyvų kariuomenės judėjimą pirmyn ir atgal. Straipsnyje nagrinėjama, kaip fronto linijos kaita, Rusijos armijų sėkmės ir nesė-kmės prisidėjo prie Rusijos kariuomenės įvaizdžio lietuvių diskurse kaitos. Šios kaitos bruožai atskleidžiami analizuojant tiek pradiniu Didžiojo karo periodu oficialioje spaudoje palaikytas nuostatas, tiek ir individualiose refleksijose (dienoraščiuose, atsiminimuose) pasireiškusius Rusijos kariuomenės vertinimus. Keliamas klausimas, kaip kito Rusijos kariuomenės įvaizdis minėtu laikotarpiu, kuriuos ir kodėl šio kismo momentus galima išskirti kaip esminius. PAGRINDINIAI ŽODŽIAI: Pirmasis pasaulinis karas, Rusijos imperijos kariuomenė, kariuomenės įvaizdis, diskursas, karo propaganda, karo reprezentavimas, karo recepcija.
When writing about the Russian army, authors both in Russia and in other European countries have often stated that before the Great War, the image of the army was determined by a previous legacy. In the early 20th century, the Russian army was still seen as 'behind', an idea that was influenced by the Crimean (1853-1856), Ottoman (1877 Ottoman ( -1878 , and especially Russo-Japanese (1904 -1905 wars. for example, Vladimir Serebrianikov, a former Soviet officer and sociologist, maintained that in the early 20th century, the image of its own army in the society of the Russian Empire was deteriorating inexorably, 1 so that by the eve of the Great War it would have already hit an unprecedented low. Although in Russia itself the assessment of its military capability and readiness for war remained cautious and sceptical, other participants in the 'European concert' at the time were not so sure about Russia's capabilities. The assessment of Russia as weak and totally unprepared for war, which spread abroad immediately after its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, tended to change. The main reason for this change was the military reforms of [1905] [1906] [1907] [1908] [1909] [1910] [1911] [1912] , which formed preconditions for West European political and military circles to see the growing capabilities of the Russian army. If Britain and france overestimated it, the Austrians and especially the Germans clearly underrated Russia's potential.
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At least the change from Yuri Danilov's defensive plan of 1910 to Mikhail Alekseev's offensive plan of 1912 3 shows that post-Japanese-war reforms also influenced the attitudes of various strata of society in the Russian Empire. Thus, the image of the Imperial Russian army was indeed far from being coherent and indisputable.
The image of the Russian army in Lithuanian society, and the issue of how it changed due to the experience of the Great War, have so far hardly been explored. Historical research exists about the course of the Great War in the future Lithuania, the mass displacement of the population, the phenomenon of Ober Ost, the experience of the German occupation, the attitude of German soldiers towards Ober Ost, etc. Christopher Barthel's recent dissertation showed how the former Russian rule was contested in German newspapers published in Ober Ost from late 1915, 4 but the lo-cal Lithuanian-speaking population was outside their audience. Besides, historians often look at the experiences of the Lithuanian population during the war with an emphasis on the influence of the German occupation, which began in the summer and autumn of 1915. In turn, with the exception of Andrea Griffante's research, 5 the period 1914 to 1915 has not enjoyed much attention in this respect. This is rather surprising, as the period 1914 to 1915 in particular was one of the most intense stages of interaction by Lithuanian society with the daily life of the war, and at the same time the most active stage in military action in the future Lithuania. I would like to put the hypothesis that this stage was also the most important in the change of image of the Russian army: the way Lithuanians saw the Russian army for at least the next few decades might have been formed by the experiences of 1914 and 1915.
The article examines this hypothesis by revealing the image of the Russian army in Lithuanian society in the context of the changing situation on the German-Russian front. The question is asked how this image was changed in the initial phase of the Great War (1914) (1915) by the successful, at least that is how it seemed at first, campaign to East Prussia, and the catastrophic retreat from the German army, which eventually occupied the territory of the future Lithuania. Which moments in this change can be distinguished as essential, and why? Answers to these questions will be offered here by examining both the provisions maintained in the official press and the reflections on the Russian army revealed in individual assessments. This is done on the assumption that individuals judged the Russian army in different ways, because the assessment depended on changes in military action, the political, economic and social circumstances of a particular war situation, and ultimately on personal emotions, expectations and beliefs. Thus, the article analyses both the official discourse, which encouraged people to see the army both as an instrument of the Romanov monarchy's power and as an institution binding society, and individual assessments, which showed the image of commanders, officers and ordinary soldiers in the Imperial Russian army. This coverage by the research also determined the relevant sources used in the work. The answer was searched for both in published and in unpublished ego-documents of witnesses of the war in Lithuania in 1914-1915: diaries and memoirs. But the Lithuanian periodicals of that time (Šaltinis, Rygos garsas, Lietuvos žinios) were also seen as a significant source. They were analysed in accordance with the principle that the military censorship that determined the content of newspapers contributed fundamentally to the image of the Russian army, and inevitably affected attitudes and evaluations circulating in Lithuanian society.
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One of them is directly related to the object of the current article: GRIffANTE, Andrea. Gemeinschaft und Mythos. Zwei litauische Narrative über den Ersten Weltkrieg (1914 Weltkrieg ( /1915 . In Der Große Krieg beginnt: Sommer und Herbst 1914 = The Great War begins: Summer and Autumn 1914 (Nordost-Archiv, 2015 . Hrsg. von Joachim TAUBER. Lüneburg, 2016, S. 97-113. The 'mobilisation' of the image at the beginning of the Great War
In the initial period of the Russian-German military clash, the Russian army was portrayed in the Lithuanian press and ego-documents as morally and materially (physically) ready for war. This image was reinforced by various details that conveyed the discipline 6 of the army and the deportment of officers, and reported on kit, weaponry, equipment (e.g. binoculars), food, and behaviour towards civilians.
During the first month of the war, when the Russian army invaded East Prussia, the Lithuanian press emphasised the 'unification of the Russian people against a strong enemy' and the 'defensive character of the Russian actions'. These were ideologemes used at the beginning of the war throughout the empire. 13 It should be noted that the names of towns of Lithuanian origin were conveyed in the Lithuanian style, thus clearly implying which part of the occupied space in East Prussia was 'ours'.
At the beginning of the war, Lithuanian society had little reason to perceive the Russian army as weak and unprepared. The fact that the armed forces of the empire were not perceived as backward in terms of technical and tactical readiness was due not only to ideological provisions but also to factual circumstances. In 1905-1912, the Russian army had undergone rapid reforms in many areas: a) in 1906, actual military service in the army was reduced from five to three or four years (depending on the type of troops), while the lowest ranks in the reserve were divided into two categories; these measures aimed at the quicker recovery of the reserve exhausted by the Russo-Japanese war; b) the army was equipped with new field and heavy artillery guns, modified machine guns, rifles, revolvers and pistols, and in 1911 the formation of the first military aviation units began; c) in 1909-1912, they There is little doubt that many of these images appeared in the Lithuanian press from the central publications of St Petersburg (Petrograd 23 ) and Moscow. for example, during the initial period of the war, the image of the Russian army as a perfectly prepared armed force was opposed to the image of the German army as the main opponent. The basis for this provision was the image supported by the official discourse of the 'high morale of the Russian army that overwhelms the technical advantages of the German army.' 24 On 24 September (7 October) 1914, the Russkoe Slovo newspaper wrote: 'The German army is a faceless, spiritless mass, consisting of automatons, as if with wires and switches: each of them operates under the direction of others. The Kaiser puts pressure on the military commanders, they put pressure on the next subordinates, and so on, down to the last private. This is how the automatic army works, its automatic strategy and tactics, even the automat-ic discipline and courage.' 25 In turn, the image of the Russian army was shaped by emphasising its 'human dimension': apparently, the technically well-equipped and 'automatically trained' German army could be defeated by the 'Russian soldier-human' with all his inherent strengths, weaknesses and shortcomings. 26 Readers of the newspaper were persuaded that the 'simple Russian soldier' perceived his responsibility to the Russian people, and therefore his fighting spirit was much stronger than the German soldier, 'who was better armed, but obeying the whims of commanders'. 27 These narratives became especially pronounced in the Lithuanian press in the winter of 1914-1915, when the 10th Russian Army managed to stop the German military offensive in the Suwałki province. During this period we find statements in the Lithuanian press about the 'superiority of the Russian soldier's ingenuity and courage against the technically stronger Germans', and the 'moral strength of the Russian soldier', which 'led to the German offensive being stopped'.
28
Another example is how the image of the use of modern tactics in the Russian armed forces was taken over. The central press noted that Russian soldiers were taught to attack in wide ranks and short charges, exploiting the features of the terrain, and shooting from different positions and distances, thus avoiding greater losses of live power during the attack. Meanwhile, 'The German advance guard attacked in close ranks and dense lines, just like the Teutonic Knights.' 29 Similar opinions are found in the Lithuanian press. One issue of Šaltinis in 1914 said: 'The Germans attack the opponent in dense teams, so many of them fall dead or wounded.' 30 The publication emphasised that the success of the offensive battle tactics used by the Russian army 'strongly raise the morale of its soldiers', while the 'German tactic of assaulting in dense ranks' weakens soldiers' morale due to the heavy losses.
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However, all this was written by Lithuanian authors and placed in the censored press. Individual assessments were somewhat more cautious. Even considering that the memoirs below were written after the war, there are many commonalities in their assessments. for example, in describing the mobilisation, Antanas Vireliūnas stated in his memoirs: 'There was no militant attitude, even among Russian officials who were conscripted, although they pretended to be militant, but lamely; they were clearly dressed for clerical work, rather than for combat. The memoirs of witnesses questioned the level of preparedness of the Russian army as well. for example, at the time of the first mobilisation in the Lithuanian-speaking provinces and the 1st Army passing them, they quickly noted that the largest part of the army consisted of infantry, pushed 'on foot' into combat positions, armed with old weapons and poorly fed. 35 Many of the soldiers were allegedly not sure 'why they are going into war against the German', so they were mostly guided by the saying 'orders are orders.' 36 Witnesses who observed Russian military logistics at the border also expressed doubts. The press informed people that not only men suitable for service, but also machinery was called up, 'taking cars, as well as buses, lorries with carriages attached, free hauls and motorcycles for the army's needs'. 37 However, witnesses noted at the same time in diaries that all of the equipment was used by commanders (and was apparently used not only for the purposes of service). Meanwhile, local military logistics were supposed to be secured by 'mobilised carriers and carriages requisitioned from farmers of the Suwałki, Kaunas and Vilnius provinces'.
38
It is true that the Lithuanian public undoubtedly positively accepted some of the decisions of the Russian military leadership. for example, the abolition of the monopoly on vodka in the border provinces during the call-up period was treated in memoirs as a positive factor, not only for the army but also for the 'people of Lithuania'. 39 In the opinion of some witnesses, the restrictions that the military authorities placed on the sale of colonial goods, and mediation in the purchase of horses and livestock, also had more benefits than drawbacks. This was a 'blow' to Jewish businesses. The Battle of Tannenberg at the end of August (new style) 1914 began to change all previous assessments featuring exaggerated enthusiasm, although the positive treatment of the Russian army was maintained for some time out of inertia. 'It cannot be that such a large number of troops can get lost somewhere,' Jonas Balys wrote. 51 According to Petkevičaitė-Bitė, after being defeated at Tannenberg in Russia, and in the same way in Lithuanian society, 'all the speculation about the outcome of the war has ended; they were repeating only military jokes, which you could hear occasionally, especially about the Russian invasion of Prussia. About how the German population fled, and deliberately left only prostitutes and old men, who were watching every step taken by the Russian army, and reporting everything with telephones that were usually kept in beehives. In addition to livestock, as if in a hurry, they left all kinds of alcohol in the cellars, which, of course, the Russian army, and especially its officers, tasted and did not spit out…' 52 Some contemporaries were convinced that the failure of the Russian army in East Prussia was due to the fact that it had allegedly begun to plunder the farms; that forced German officers, many of whom had estates in the province, 'to push Kaiser Wilhelm to defend their property'. 53 In any case, it was quite clear that, especially as regards the long-term distancing of the assessment, in the words of Martynas Yčas, 'the Battle of Tannenberg was a great moral and material blow to the Russians, from which they did not recover throughout the Great War.'
54
The rumours and testimonies about the conduct of the Russian army in East Prussia contributed to the assessment of the changing attitudes to it in Lithuanian society during this period. Despite all this, the robberies on East Prussian farms and the forced eviction of the population from the easternmost German province to the depths of Russia were already reflected as a sign of 'major disaster for Lithuania '. 59 However, the most significant change in the image of the Russian army was due to the withdrawal of the remains of the 1st Army through Lithuanian-inhabited areas. During this period, many testimonies emerge about heavy-handed officers, regardless of their social origin or cultural level, who allegedly commanded the Russian army. Such officers purportedly sent hundreds and thousands of ordinary soldiers to die, without qualms, in pursuit of strategically and tactically insignificant goals. 64 They usually did so only to curry favour with their seniors, or to explain that 'only big losses' without sparing human resources 'testify to the great activity of the unit'. 65 In all the individual assessments, we see an emerging basic provision, the leadership of the Russian army was understood to use 'primitive tactics' leading to retreat. 66 It was claimed that, due to these tactics, the Imperial Russian army was unable to keep even well-equipped and consolidated positions for long, and then it was forced to retreat. 67 The fact that after Tannenberg the Russian army was seen as an army of 'heavy losses' was also significant, because the 1st Army was formed on the basis of the troops stationed in the Vilnius military district. Thus, it was perceived that it had a large Lithuanian contingent, and now, because of poor leadership, the 'Lithuanian men' would die or disappear. 68 As was noted by the artist Antanas Žmuidzinavičius in his memoirs, everyone called up to the Russian army had the same destiny, 'to go and die.' 69 The emerging reservation of the Lithuanians regarding the Imperial Russian army was further fuelled by the conviction that the army's leadership was allegedly using troops 'called up from non-Russians' for the most difficult parts of the front.
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This created preconditions for the belief that a large part of the casualties in the battles in East Prussia, especially in the late autumn of 1914 near the Masurian Lakes, were Lithuanians in Imperial Russian soldiers' uniforms. 71 Petkevičaitė-Bitė noted:
'The Russian authorities and officers do not care about the lives of their soldiers, especially the non-Russians,' in this way attempting 'to bleed' the national minorities.
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The difficult situation of Lithuanians serving in the Russian army was explained not only by objective circumstances (disruptions to supplies, poor organisation), but also by the view among commanding officers of non-Russian soldiers as unreliable subordinates. 73 In some cases, the great social differences and the disjuncture between officers and soldiers in the Russian army were particularly emphasised. (1914-1918 m.) . Karo archyvas, 1937, t. VIII, p. 131. alised, and mistreated 'civilian prisoners' pushed out of East Prussia, was becoming increasingly dominant.
All this was reinforced by reflections on the forced displacement 77 of the civilian population from the border areas of the Russian Empire (for example, the Suwałki province). Officially targeting Jews and 'Germans', the displacement also affected Lithuanian-speaking Lutherans who had lived in the border areas for several centuries. The Catholic majority in Lithuanian society reacted ambiguously to this. Some witnesses perceived it as 'deserved retaliation'. That was because, in the Suwałki province, the Imperial Russian authorities treated Lithuanian-speaking Lutherans 'much better than real Lithuanians […] no German went against the Tsar's rule. On the contrary, to the Russian government, they were spies and squealers,' and when the war began, 'things became different, the Russians trusted Lithuanians much more, and sent many German men away from the front, to the Vilnius province or elsewhere.' 78 However, other witnesses did not avoid noticeable criticism. 'When the Germans seized their positions in the Suwałki province, the Russians, unable to get them out, accused Lithuanian Lutherans and Jews of conspiring with the Germans, reporting to them on the movements or positions of the Russians. Catholic Lithuanians who saw the Protestants as their greatest enemies were very glad about it,' 79 wrote Andrius Martus. The persecution of Jews and Lutherans, as 'unreliable subjects of the Romanov Empire', was treated as a consequence of the paranoid 'spymania' of the Russian military government. According to Martus, this caused 'many painful misunderstandings: a woman put out white laundry on a pole that "looked like a flag signal", and was arrested […] The sails of a mill revolve, and this is also a "sign", the millers' women were hanged.' 80 Some witnesses plainly called the activities of the Russian army (especially in the Suwałki province) 'spymania', the persecution of wrongly accused people, which, among other things, also created conditions for 'malicious abuse' (denunciations, acts of revenge). 81 In general, it was claimed that the 'issue of spies' became a concern for the Russian army only when it began to fail in East Prussia and its leadership became concerned about actions against the 'enemy in the rear' along the border. These actions only strengthened the conviction that the Russian army was 'completely ignorant of the lives of its own people and those of others'. 82 There was an intention to see 'spymania' as the outcome of mistrust of the central government, with Imperial Russian subjects testifying to the 'weakening of Russia itself'.
83
The image of the Russian army was finally basically undermined by the retreat that started in the spring of 1915. Lasting until the end of September, the retreat in separate stages was filled with images in ego-documents of the straggling army. Although there were exceptions, 84 it was usually stated that the troops retreated 'full front', and did not want to fight, and there were mass desertions, while officers avoided direct battles, and attempted to escape from the front line as quickly as possible (often using cars 'mobilised' in 1914). 85 It was claimed that the Germans 'captured hundreds of Russian soldiers', 86 thus fuelling the image that the German army allegedly 'gathers prisoners' without any great loss. Amid the straggling army, the Cossacks were regarded as the only part of the Russian troops that remained combat ready: the authors of memoirs present them as 'brave warriors', who often took initiatives, and in this way protected the retreating units from total destruction.
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The retreat was so widespread that it eventually led to a questioning of the image of the Imperial Russian army as a 'powerful and morally unified force'. Already at the beginning of 1915, we see the first doubts about the Russian army's size as a factor that would automatically determine the outcome of the war. Petkevičaitė-Bitė, comparing the military capabilities of Russia and Germany, explained in her diary that Russia was able to 'turn the border zone of Germany into an empty field. Not only by burning houses and food, which cannot be taken away, but also by burning trees and fields, cutting down gardens, and poisoning wells.' 88 Despite the use of the most 82 ŽUKAUSKAS, Bernardas. Pirmojo pasaulinio karo tremty. Atsiminimų pluoštas. Chicago, IL, 1961, p. 18-22. 83 ŽADEIKIS, P. Op. cit., p. 48-49. 84 Juozas Breiva, who served as a priest in the village of Daugai in the Trakai district in the Vilnius province during the war, later wrote: 'I remember the Russian army's last afternoon in Daugai. Although it was already clear that it was the Russians' last day, the army was still struggling to keep up its courage and vigilance. The choir, which sang several charming songs, was especially beautiful and noteworthy.' (BREIVA, Juozas. Atsiminimai iš vokiečių okupacijos laikų Dauguose. Karo archyvas, 1938, t. IX, p. 193 Lietuva -Rytų Prūsija 1914 -1915 m. Karininko atsiminimai. Kaunas, 1935 . 'Right or wrong, the Cossacks are considered to be extraordinarily courageous men. At least it's clear that they are not cowards. After all, you don't need much courage for an ambush, even against a much more numerous enemy. The five Cossacks instantly decided that about 30 Germans would not be too much for them, and the first unexpected shots allowed this number to be drastically shrunk' (see [NORBUTAS, Juozas] fierce fighting techniques, it would be difficult to defeat Germany, because it is like a 'hundred-headed hydra, only hungrier, crueller, twisting and turning with the devil's cunning. How many of them are there in comparison with their enemies? True Germans, Austrians, a few Turks, a handful of Romanians, and that's it. And where don't you find them? Look at the Pacific Ocean, look at the Atlantic Ocean, Persia, China, Mesopotamia, Suez, not to mention the Mediterranean Sea, the Balkans, now the Italian front, and both vast fronts in the East and the West.'
89 Petkevičaitė-Bitė states:
'You will find Germans in the air, and under the water, they are everywhere…' 90 The 'scorched earth' tactics applied by the retreating Russian troops, in some cases were perceived as proof that 'the Russians will not return.'
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Undoubtedly, in this context, doubts about the tactical readiness of the Russian troops only tended to grow stronger. As Virelūnas pointed out, the artillery often shot without even aiming, 'just pretending to fight, trying to impress the leadership by their good performance.' 92 Meanwhile, the German artillery 'hits very accurately', and 'wipes out' the Russian army's batteries, even in well-established positions and hard areas for artillery to reach.
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According to the testimonies, the morale of the retreating Russian army reached its lowest point. The behaviour of officers and soldiers was regarded as endangering both the Russian army and the civilian population of Lithuania. According to Martus, the situation of girls and women was particularly dangerous: '1) refusing to have "relations", they were accused of being "spies"; 2) "contacts" were established through the factor. 94 This is especially true for refugees […] because refugees did not have food. As a result, soldiers "patronised" families with girls and women who were suitable for them […] Immediately after entering a town or a city, Russian soldiers first look for innocent girls for officers.' 95 Martus is particularly stern: 'This is how they, all the bastards of Russia in a variety of ways, plundered the dearest asset of Lithuania, its innocence. They slaughtered animals, burned houses, cut down forests, mixed fertile land with spoiled land, but everything can be repaired. However, the plunder of innocence is the most painful and irreversible loss for Lithuania.'
96
Attempts to explain the behaviour of the Russian soldiers towards the civilian population in Lithuania not only emphasised their weak discipline, but also appealed to human fallibility. for example, Petkevičaitė-Bitė discussed in her diary that Russian soldiers who had already doubted 'the justice of this war', and were tired of the cruelties of war and the cruel behaviour of officers, were simply looking for close contact with people who had not yet been damaged by the war. The writer stated that humane behaviour, even with soldiers who had lost their dignity because of the war, awakened the humanity in their hearts, and reduced the 'bad intentions' against the 'calm population '. 97 This note by Petkevičaitė, inter alia, is a clear reference to the attempts to avoid and prevent distressing behaviour by soldiers (based on the condemnation of civilians as a 'non-participating' party 'which does not understand anything') that affected the civil population in any violent way.
In some cases, attempts were made to explain the extreme conduct of soldiers towards civilians by their insensitivity under the circumstances and conditions of war. 'As far as I could see,' Juozas Kudirka wrote, 'Russian soldiers in the battlefield are very cold-blooded and calm, as if they are simply doing some routine task at home. They go into battle joking, often they fight with jokes, and they laugh after the battle is over. A bullet would fly past his ear: a soldier would curse, spit on the ground, and continue shooting at his enemy. They do not pay much attention to their killed friends. They would shake their head, look at the corpse, curse the German, and walk away.' 98 This assessment of soldiers' insensitivity to the horrors of war contributed to the premise that this was the root cause of their roughness with civilians.
In addition, when considering factors that led to the demoralisation of the Imperial Russian army, and such considerations in Lithuanian society arose primarily as a result of the experience of 1915, the fact that the army was made up of a poorly educated and 'culturally limited' contingent was explained as one of the causes of its weakness. 99 Allegedly, the aspirations and moral compass of soldiers, in the light of the horrors of war, could fundamentally vary, and in practice were hardly controlled. 100 Second, as has already been mentioned, the social and cultural disparities between the leadership and the ordinary soldiers was noted in the army. Quite often, the reserved attitude of officers towards soldiers was blamed by the 'archaic' way of thinking of the former, based on the pre-modern social hierarchy. It followed that soldiers could be abusive, assuming that that was the nature of the ordinary soldier originating from the 'non-enlightened peasantry', and you could not change the nature. 101 Third, explanations were sought in the social differences that arose due to the different levels of development of different parts of the Russian 97 PETKEVIČAITĖ-BITĖ, G. Op. cit., t. I, p. 149-151. 98 KUDIRKA, Juozas. Karēs baisenybēs Lietuvoje. Pragyventų valandų atsiminimai. Chicago, IL, 1916, p. 20-21. 99 for critisicm on the stereotype of the Russian soldiers' 'backwardness', see NARSKII, Igor V. The frontline Experience of Russian Soldiers in 1914 -16. Russian Studies in History, 2013 VIRELIŪNAS, A. Op. cit., PETKEVIČAITĖ-BITĖ, G. Op. cit., t. I, p. 65. The diary of Petkevičaitė-Bitė represents some individual reflections with plenty of sympathy for Russian soldiers who originated from 'hard labourer peasants', who lacked an education and a broader cultural outlook, but were not as 'refined' as their officers.
Empire. Allegedly, soldiers from the interior of the empire, because of the 'different customs' they had, or the 'different rules' they were accustomed to, could not desist from abuse, not only in unfriendly East Prussia, but also in their 'own' provinces of Suwałki, Kaunas and Vilnius. 102 fourth, the deviational conduct of Russian soldiers was explained as an element of the ordinary and 'oriental' lifestyle characteristic of the whole Russian army, an entertainment, or simply an expression of despotism.
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Of course, all these attitudes were supported by specific elements of military experience. I am referring to the fact that the 1st and 10th Russian armies that moved through the length and breadth of the Lithuanian-speaking provinces in 1914 and 1915 had highly mixed units, with a large number of soldiers from Siberia, Central Asia and the Caucasus. This ensured the contact of the Lithuanian people with soldiers whose appearance and behaviour they perceived based on already-existing 'oriental' stereotypes. 
Conclusions
In assessing the change in the image of the Russian army in Lithuanian society during the early stages of the Great War, it is first of all important to realise that this image was severely affected by the conditions of war. This is illustrated by at least some of the arguments discussed in the article. first, amid conditions of military action, the military authorities and the rear facilitated the prevalence of images of the invincibility of the Imperial Russian army in Lithuanian society. During the period when mobilisation took place, during the movement of the Russian army in provinces inhabited by Lithuanian speakers and its invasion of East Prussia, the army was perceived as a factor of great power, both in terms of material characteristics and according to moral (psychological) criteria. This increased the apparent need for a major part of the Lithuanian public to consider the Russian army as its 'own', capable of rescuing Lithuanians from the invasion by the 'Teutons'. Secondly, in the conditions of war, there was something called negative adjustment by psychologists: the actions of the Imperial Russian army and some of the deviant behaviour were perceived as 'normal', justified by the conditions of war.
However, even accepting that this image of the Russian army depended on the specific war situation, we have to state that the change in the view of the army reveals wider modifications, which manifested in Lithuanian society in just one year. Egodocuments reveal that during the first months of the war, the prevailing approach was to support the Russian troops, to help its soldiers, and not to be worried about the losses they caused. In this solidarity, Lithuanian society expressed not only the need to protect itself from the German invasion, but also the political expectations that were associated with the invasion by the Imperial Russian army of East Prussia at the beginning of the war.
However, in the winter of 1914/1915, an image emerged of the resigned and retreating army, unfriendly towards the local population. It is understandable that the army was perceived as a representation of Russia itself, and therefore the change in military expectations also expressed changes in the view of the Empire. Galiausiai Rusijos kariuomenės įvaizdį pablogino Rusijos kariuomenės vadovybės sankcionuotas Romanovų imperijos "nepatikimų pavaldinių" persekiojimas ("šnipomanijos" kampanija), oficialiai nukreiptas prieš žydus ir "vokiečius", tačiau faktiškai palietęs ir pasienio srityse nuo seno gyvenusius lietuviakalbius evangelikus liuteronus. Šie veiksmai tik stiprino įsitikinimą, kad Rusijos kariuomenė "visiškai nevertina nei svetimų, nei savo žmonių gyvybių".
Vertinant Rusijos kariuomenės įvaizdžio kaitą lietuvių visuomenėje Didžiojo karo pradžio-je, svarbu suvokti, kad tas įvaizdis buvo smarkiai paveiktas karo sąlygų. Tą rodo bent keli straipsnyje aptarti argumentai. Pirma, atsidūrimas karo veiksmų, karinės valdžios ir fronto užnugaryje palengvino lietuvių visuomenėje įsigalėti vaizdiniams apie imperijos kariuomenės nenugalimumą. Kol vyko mobilizacija, Rusijos kariuomenės judėjimas lietuviakalbių apgyventose gubernijose ir jos įsiveržimas į Rytų Prūsiją, kariuomenė buvo suvokiama kaip didelės galios veiksnys tiek pagal materialius požymius, tiek ir pagal moralinius (psichologinius) kriterijus. Tai didino pastebimos lietuvių visuomenės dalies poreikį laikyti Rusijos kariuomenę "sava", galinčia išgelbėti lietuvius nuo "teutonų" įsiver-žimo. Antra, karo sąlygomis pasireiškė ir tai, ką psichologai vadina negatyviąja adaptacija: imperijos kariuomenės veiksmai ir kai kurios deviacinės elgsenos suvoktos kaip karo padėties sąlygų pateisinamas "normalumas".
Tačiau netgi suvokiant šį Rusijos kariuomenės įvaizdžio priklausomumą nuo karo padė-ties situacijos, tenka konstatuoti, kad kariuomenės vertinimo kaita atskleidžia platesnes permainas, pasireiškusias lietuvių visuomenėje viso labo per vienerius metus. Egodokumentai atskleidžia, kad pirmaisiais karo mėnesiais vyravo nuostata remti Rusijos kariuomenę, padėti jos kareiviams, per daug nesisieloti dėl jų sukeltų nuostolių. Lietuvių visuomenė šiuo solidarumu išreiškė ne tik poreikį apsisaugoti nuo Vokietijos invazijos, bet ir politinius lūkesčius, kurie karo pradžioje buvo siejami su imperijos kariuomenės įsiverži-mu į Rytų Prūsiją. Tačiau 1914-1915 m. žiemą formuojasi atsitraukiančios, rezignuojančios, vietiniams gyventojams nedraugiška tampančios imperijos kariuomenės vaizdinys.
Suprantama, kad kariuomenė buvo suvokiama kaip pačios Rusijos reprezentacija, todėl kariuomenės vertinimų kaita išreiškė ir pokyčius vertinant imperiją. Atsitraukimas, veiksmai prieš civilius gyventojus buvo vertinami kaip ryškėjančio imperijos silpnumo
